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Abstract
This article discusses the plan and construction of Sino-
Myanmar transport corridor and analyzes its implication from 
four dimensions: history, regional cooperation, China’s overall 
strategy and Yunnan’s perspective. The corridor is one part of an 
ambitious scheme that will put the provincial capital of Kunming 
at the centre of a regional free trade zone. The project is mainly 
motivated by China’s economic and political-cum strategic 
considerations, and will draw closer bilateral geopolitical and 
economic bond. It will not only further integrate two countries’ 
economy but combine both political and strategic interests. Thus, it 
contains India’s influence in Myanmar, and finally expands its 
strategic influence into Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Also, 
Naypyidaw’s isolation by western countries and the project of 
China-Myanmar oil & gas pipelines have given China favourable 
opportunities to realize its old dream of China-Burma/Myanmar 
transport link.
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Myanmar’s importance in world affairs has long derived from its criti-
cal geostrategic position. Not until the Second World War, when it became 
China’s “gateway” or “back door,”1) had China really realized that Burma 
occupied a military necessity2) and geostrategic position of some impor-
tance. Since then, the “Burma Road” has become a concrete and the most 
well known example illustrating Chinese understanding of Myanmar’s im-
portance for China.
When the map of traffic construction in Southwest (particularly Yun-
nan Province) China is spread out, Beijing’s fan-shaped “Look South” 
strategy with Yunnan as the pivot is clear at a glance. The strategy is ex-
tending southward, and the traffic between China and Southeast Asia has 
never been so closely interconnected with each other. 
Yunnan shares 4,060 km land border with Laos, Myanmar and Viet-
nam. There are 11 first-category ports, 9 second-category ports, and over 
90 passages to the outside world in Yunnan province. For China, the prov-
ince is the most convenient location connecting the Indian Ocean with the 
Pacific Ocean, bridging three markets of China, Southeast Asia and South 
Asia. 
Yunnan side planned the initiative of “Yunnan International Passage” 
in 1992. However, it had had not occasion to undertake the blue print until 
the “Western Development” strategy was started in 1999. In order to miti-
gate the gap of economic disparities between East and West China, redress 
the long-standing domestic imbalance of regional development, a drive 
was launched by Beijing in 1999 to promote social and economic progress 
in the central and western parts of the country by injecting financial aid 
and offering favorable policies. In the plan of “Western Development”, 
transport is prioritized in its national economic development. 
Under the circumstance, Yunnan soon formulated the basic program, 
general objective and main task of “Western Development” in the province, 
and formally established the aim of constructing it as an international 
passage connecting China to Southeast Asia and South Asia at the Ninth 
Plenary Session of the Sixth Yunnan Provincial Committee of the Chinese 
 1)  See, for example, H. I. Deigan, Burma-Gateway to China, Smithsonian Institution War 
Background Studies No. 17, 1943; “World Battlefronts: Back Door to China”, Time, Vol. XL 
No. 25, December 21, 1942.
 2)  Patrick Fitzgerald, “The Yunnan-Burma Road”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 95, No. 3, 
(Mar., 1940), pp.164-165.
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Communist Party (CCP) in December, 1999. 
Yunnan government articulated that “the construction of internation-
al passage is Yunnan’s inevitable choice of exerting its location advantage 
and expanding opening-up. To make full use of Yunnan’s beneficial factors 
of linking China with Southeast Asia and South Asia by land, water, and 
air.” “By all means, seize the opportunity of ‘Western Development’, con-
struct highway and rail as the keystone and skeleton of Yunnan traffic 
net, air and water carriage as the accessorial, which link neighboring 
countries and domestic provinces, and form a shortcut and convenient 
transport net connecting with sea via Guizhou, Guangxi eastwards, with 
middle-west area via Sichuan northwards, with peripheral Vietnam, Laos, 
Thailand and Myanmar southwards.”3)
As a result, China has made efforts to undertake and push Sino-My-
anmar transport corridor since the advent of the 21st century. The project 
is driven by China’s geo-economic and geo-strategic interests, and is also 
Beijing’s step to implement “Two-Ocean” strategy which will affect the ge-
opolitics in South Asia and Southeast Asia. The corridor has an important 
impact on the current and future Sino-Myanmar relations, which is like 
an adhesive to draw closer bilateral geopolitical and economic bond. 
CHINA-MYANMAR ROADS
The strategy of “Yunnan International Passage” consists of three di-
mensions: transportation construction of Yunnan-foreign countries, Yun-
nan-other domestic provinces, and Yunnan province itself.4) On road’s part, 
Yunnan lays out the framework of the “International Passage”, and plans 
to build “three vertical lines”, “three horizontal lines” and “nine passages”. 
“Three vertical lines” includes: (1). Yibin-Zhaotong-Kunming-Hekou 
(1,016 km); (2). Dukou-Yongren-Wuding-Kunming-Mohan (958 km); (3). 
Yanjing-Deqin-Zhongdian-Dali-Lincang-Daluo (1,397 km).5) 
“Three horizontal lines”: (1). Pan Zhihua-Huaping-Lijiang-Jianchuan-
 3)  Li Jiating, Yunnan Governor, “Constructing Distinct Economic System during Western De-
velopment”, in Go West: Chinese Summit’s Viewpoints on Western Development, Beijing: 
Central Party Literature Press, 2001, p.134.
 4)  Niu Shaoyao, “Yunnan: Constructing International Passage”, People’s Daily, August 28, 
2000.
 5)  Hekou, Mohan and Daluo are China-Vietnam, China-Laos and China-Myanmar border cit-
ies, respectively.
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Lanping-Liuku (642 km); (2). Guizhou-Sheng Jingguan-Qujing-Kunming-
Dali-Baoshan-Ruili (965 km); (3). Guangxi-Funing-Kaiyuan-Jianshui-Yu-
anjiang-Puer-Jinggu-Lincang-Qing Shuihe (1,493 km).
“Nine passages”: Five passages connecting Yunnan to other provinces, 
namely, (1). “Kunming-Nanning-Beihai (553 km in Yunnan); (2). Kunming-
Guiyang (204 km in Yunnan); (3). Kunming-Shuifu-Chengdu (250 km in 
Yunnan); (4). Kunming-Pan Zhihua-Chengdu (250 km in Yunnan); (5). 
Kunming-Dali-Zhongdian-Tibet (950 km in Yunnan). Four passages con-
necting Yunnan to Southeast Asian countries: (1). Kunming-Mohan-Laos-
Bankok; (2). Kunming-Ruili-Yangon; (3). Kunming-Hekou-Vietnam; (4). 
Kunming-Tengchong-Myanmar-India.6)
In light of Yunnan’s road layout on “International Passage”, there are 
three road lines reaching China-Myanmar border in the six lines of “three 
vertical” and “three horizontal”. In “Nine passages”, there are two passag-
es leading to Myanmar. The roads of Kunming-Ruili-Yangon and Kun-
ming-Tengchong-Myanmar-India are actually the updated versions of the 
Burma Road and the Stilwell Road.
In recent years, Beijing and Yunnan have built and upgraded some 
roads extending to Myanmar in Yunnan and some leading to Yunnan in 
Myanmar territory. See Table 1.
Table 1  The built roads of China-Myanmar Transport Corridor 
Value unit: RMB billion Yuan
Road Name Road Class Length Investment Building Time
Kunming-An Ning Highway 22.3748 km 2.81 2004- 2007
An Ning-Chu xiong Highway 129.93 km 4.9 2002- 2005
Chuxiong-Dali Highway 179.279 km 5.2921991 1995-1999
Dali-Baoshan Highway 165.84 km 7.04 1998-2002
Baoshan-Longling Highway 76 km 5.544 2004-2008
Longling-Ruili Highway & Class II 157.712 km 10.941 2009-2012
Baoshan-Tengchong Highway 153.94 km 4.607 2007-2010
Tengchong-Myitkyina Class II 176 km 12.3 2004-2007
Jinghong-Damenglong Class II 60 km 0.445 2004-2008
Zhangfeng-Bhamo Class IV 79 km 0.028 2004-2007
Yingjiang-Nabang Class II & Class IV 92 km 0.23 2003-2005
Tengchong-Banwa Class II 71.8 km 0.46 2003-2006
 6)  Chen Ping, “Survey on ‘three vertical lines’, ‘three horizontal lines’ and ‘nine passages’ 
Highway Net in Yunnan”, January 29, 2008, <http://yunnan.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/sjdixi-
answ/200801/20080105359455.html>, accessed April 6, 2008.
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SOURCE: Department of Communications of Yunnan Province; China Communications 
News; China Railway Construction News; The Economic and Commercial Section of the Con-
sulate General of PRC in Mandalay; Yunnan Highway Development and Investment Co., Ltd.
NOTE: Longling-Ruili highway includes 154.6km highway and 3.112 km class II road, and 
links up Ruili-Bhamo road; Baoshan-Tengchong highway needs building 63.94 km length 
and use available 90 km Baoshan-Longling highway, connecting to Tengchong- Myitkyina 
road; The terminals of Jinghong-Damenglong and Tengchong-Banwa are China-Myanmar 
border demarcation stone No.240 and No. 4, respectively.
According to the “Layout of Yunnan Road Net（2005-2020）”, Yunnan 
plans to construct main highway passages leading to Vietnam, Laos, My-
anmar, and Thailand by 2010. Its trunk highway net will link up all 20 
ports in Yunnan. 18 passages will reach Myanmar (13), Vietnam (4) and 
Laos (1).7) Table 1 shows that 95 percent of Kunming-Ruili highway, via An 
Ning, Chuxiong, Dali, Baoshan and Longling, has been open to traffic, 
whose remained section, Longling-Ruili highway, has also been under con-
struction. Regarding the passage to South Asia via Myanmar, Baoshan-
Tengchong highway and Tengchong-Myitkyina road Class II were built 
and upgraded in 2007. 
Besides the trunk highway stretching to Myanmar, China has built 
and upgraded many roads to Sino-Myanmar border ports, such as Jin-
ghong-Da Menglong, Zhangfeng-Bhamo, Tengchong-Banwa, and Yingjing-
Banwa, especially since 2005 when Yunnan began to implement the pro-
ject of “Prosper the Borders to Enrich Local People”(PBELP).
In response to “Western Development” strategy, the State Ethnic Af-
fairs Commission (SEAC), China, initialized the PBELP project in 135 bor-
der cities and counties in 2000, whose aim is to lift the economic develop-
ment levels of China’s border area within 10 years by increasing 
infrastructure investment and promoting a group of profitable programs. 
Yunnan pooled RMB 4.8 billion Yuan to carry out the PBELP project 
in its 8 prefectures and cities, and 25 border counties from 2005 to 2007, 
which completed the connection of trunk highway in border areas and sur-
face hardening of roads leading to township in the province.8) “The Elev-
 7)  Department of Communications of Yunnan Province, “Layout of Yunnan Road Net (2005-
2020)”, <http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/bgt_Model1/newsview.aspx?id=236838>, accessed in May 8, 
2008.
 8)  General Office of the People’s Government of Yunnan Province, “The Completion condition 
of 20 Key Project in Yunnan”, <http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/bgt_Model1/newsview.aspx?id=
236889>, accessed September 10, 2008.
RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS48 【Vol. 10
enth Five-Year Plan for Prosper the Borders to Enrich Local People” en-
dorsed by the State Council on June 9, 2007 sets the first aim of improving 
backward situations in communications, electricity, irrigation works infra-
structure in border areas. One of its main tasks is to reinforce the con-
struction of highway in border region, including trunk highway and road 
to counties and villages, to ports, sites for barter trade, tourist sites, and 
defence highway suited for both military and civilian services through 
both [The people’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the local governemnt] joint 
construction.9) 
In May, 2008, a new three-year project of PBELP in Yunnan began to 
be carried out. The key task of the new project is to, in combination with 
the construction of defence highway and “Yunnan International Passage”, 
expedite the construction of highway net, upgrade the road and strive for 
the completion of 750 km trunk highway and 2,100 km county road in bor-
der region, gradually solve the transport bottleneck hampering the fron-
tier development. In response, Yunnan has pooled RMB 10.71847 billion 
Yuan for the new project.10)
Currently, although Beijing has not definitely upgraded the “Yunnan 
International Passage” to national strategic plan level, the central govern-
ment is building Yunnan as a land traffic pivot between the Eastern prov-
inces and Southeast Asia, in terms of “National Highway Network Plan-
ning” approved in 2004. China is investing heavily in building highway 
net connecting Yunnan with East coast developed regions and provinces in 
order to improve insufficient road infrastructure impeding economic inter-
course between them. 
The Planning includes 7 routes starting from Beijing, 9 South-North 
longitudinal routes, and 18 East-West latitudinal routes, referred to as the 
“7918 Network”, with a total length of about 85,000 km. In accordance 
with the Planning, China is building a highway from Hangzhou to, China-
Myanmar border city, Ruili (Coding G56), which is 3,405 km long via Zhe-
jiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou and Yunnan. Moreover, the 
program, noticeably, shows that five highways from developed cities to 
 9)  State Ethnic Affairs Commission of China, “The Eleventh Five-Year Plan for ‘Prosper the 
Borders to Enrich Local People’”, June 15, 2007, <http://www.seac.gov.cn/gjmw/zt/2007-06-
15/1181878972642969.htm>, accessed May 23, 2008. 
 10)  “New Three-Year Plan for ‘Prosper the Borders to Enrich Local People’ in Yunnan”, Yunnan 
Political Affairs, No.11, 2008, p.23.
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Kunming are building, namely, Shanghai-Kunming(G60, 2,370 km), Shan-
tou-Kunming(G78, 1,710 km), Guangzhou-Kunming (G80, 1,610 km), Bei-
jing-Kunming (G5, 2,865 km), and Chongqing-Kunming (G85, 838 km). 
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Myanmar on June 2 and 3, 2010, to par-
ticipate in celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between the two countries. During the two-day vis-
it, the two Premiers formally launched the construction of the Myanmar-
China oil and gas pipeline project. China’s official People’s Daily on June 5 
reported that “There are 793 kilometers of gas pipeline in Myanmar, and 
also a 771-kilometer-long crude oil pipeline. An oil port in Kyaukpyu as a 
facility is to be built for the planned China-Myanmar oil pipeline project.” 
The pipelines project will generate the boom of infrastructure, particularly 
roads along the pipelines in Myanmar. The two countries, for example, 
signed a MoU on development of cooperation in China-Myanmar Corridor 
Project to link Ruli and Kyaukpyu on May 18, 2010.11) According to the 
Corridor Project, China will help Myanmar construct railway and motor-
way from Kyaukphyu Township of Rakhine State to Ruili of China in near 
future. Due to the lack of investment by Myanmar’s government, Chinese 
infrastructure development in the country is another important aspect of 
economic assistance, which is closely linked to Chinese business interests 
in Myanmar. It helps China to secure the supply of semi-finished materi-
als for its growing economy.12)
Although the future direction of Sino-Myanmar gas and oil pipeline is 
difficult to predict, it is safe to say that the safety of the dual pipelines 
needs to be protected by the Tatmadaw. The case of the Yadana gas pipe-
line from Myanmar’s Andaman Sea to Thailand has shown that the Myan-
mar government has been militarizing the pipeline region and “The mili-
tary has been steadily building up its presence to protect the natural gas 
development activities in the region.”13) As a result, there is every reason 
to believe that one of the primary motives behind Kyaukphyu-Ruili trans-
port corridor is to more effectively protect the safety of the oil and gas 
 11)  “MoU on China-Myanmar Corridor Project inked”, The New Light of Myanmar, May19, 
2010.
 12)  Billy Tea, “China and Myanmar: Strategic Interests, Strategies and the Road Ahead”, In-
stitute of Peace and Conflict Studies Research Paper, No.26, September, 2010, p.8.
 13)  Earthrights International and Southeast Asian Information Network, Total Denial: A Re-
port on the Yadana Pipeline Project in Burma, July 10, 1996, p.13.
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pipelines.
CHINA-MYANMAR RAILWAY
In December, 1995, Premier Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia initiated 
the Trans-Asia Railway, building the Kunming-Singapore Rail Link. The 
initiative was unanimously endorsed by ASEAN countries and China. 
In response to ASEAN’s initiative on Trans-Asia Railway, China for-
mulated three route options: (1).east route, Singapore-Kuala Lumpur-
Bangkok-Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh-Hanoi-Kunming; (2). west route, Sin-
gapore-Kuala Lumpur-Bangkok-Yangon-Lashio-Ruili-Dali-Kunming; (3). 
middle route, Singapore-Kuala Lumpur-Bangkok-Vientiane-Shangyong-
Xiangyun（or Yuxi）-Kunming. Nowadays, the three routes in Chinese 
territory have been listed into “National Middle/Long Term Transport 
Plans of China” issued in 2004.
The West route is 2,600 km-long, and needs building 840 km new rail-
ways, of which China-Myanmar railway is one section. In China’s section, 
Kunming-Ruili railway is 690 km long. In 1998, the railway between Kun-
ming and Dali via Guangtong was completed and put into service. So it 
still requires constructing the railway of Dali-Ruili. Besides, 132 km new 
railway from Ruili to Lashio needs building if China’s railway is linked to 
Myanmar’s railway net. Now, China is making an effort to realize the rail-
way link between Kunming and Yangon. 
In light of the “Middle/Long Term Transport Plan”, China plans to 
build the section of Kunming-Jinghong-Mohan in the Sino-Laos passage, 
the section of Dali-Ruili in the Sino-Myanmar passage, and upgrade the 
section of Kunming-Hekou in the Sino-Vietnam passage. In addition, “The 
Eleventh Five-year Plan of China’s Railway” framed by China’s Ministry 
of Railway states that it will build Dali-Ruili railway and rebuild double 
tracks railway of Kunming-Guangtong section in the Kunming-Dali before 
2010. In 2007, 350 km long Dali-Ruili railway project started, with esti-
mated total investment of RMB 14.7 billion Yuan, which was put on the 
list of “Ten Major Projects of Western Development” in that year.
Also, China-Myanmar railway will become one part of “The Third Asia 
Europe Continental Bridge” conceived by China, connecting the east coast 
of the Atlantic Ocean with China’s east coast via Yunnan. It starts at sea-
ports in Guangdong province, via Kunming, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, 
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Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, enters into Europe, and reaches Rotterdam in 
the Netherlands. China expects to link the Asian south to its Southeast re-
gion by means of west route of The Trans-Asia Railway and construct the 
“Continental Bridge” which will become China’s another safe and conveni-
ent land international thoroughfare.
Since the project of Myanmar-China oil and gas pipeline was formally 
launched in June, 2010, the two countries have been positively promoting 
the design and construction of transport infrastructure along the pipe-
lines. According to the Reuters, Myanmar and China have agreed to build 
a rail link connecting Southwest China with the Indian Ocean via Upper 
Myanmar. The railroad will be built in five stages over the next three 
years and will stretch for total of 1,215 kilometers (755 miles), from the 
Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in Myanmar’s Western Rakhine State to China’s 
Yunnan province, running parallel with two pipelines currently under con-
struction. Also, a highway, as noted above, will be constructed running par-
allel to the railroad. The road and rail will carry 12 million metric tons of 
crude oil and 12 billion cubic meters of gas annually into China within the 
next two years. The railway is part of a wide-ranging network to connect 
southwest China with its Asian neighbours through a system of railways, 
roads, power grids, telecommunication networks, oil and gas pipelines and 
ports. These projects including the rail link are just the parts of an ambi-
tious scheme that will put the provincial capital of Kunming at the centre 
of a regional free trade zone.14) China believes that Yunnan will acquire an 
outlet to the Indian Ocean when the Kunming-Kyaukphyu transport corri-
dor is put into use. It will greatly drive massive infrastructure construc-
tion in both Yunnan and Myanmar and further promote the adjustment of 
industrial structure and economic growth of Yunnan province. “Once both 
sides [China and Myanmar] benefit from this transport corridor, it will be 
a brilliant model for the countries around the Bay of Bengal to see. If so, a 
further, deeper, wider cooperation between China and the countries 
around the Bay of Bengal will ensue.”15)
 14) “Myanmar, China agree cross-border rail project”, Reuters, April 28, 2011.
 15)  Wubin, “Establish ‘Three Points, One Route’ China-Myanmar Economic Corridor”, Yunnan 
Economic Daily, July 8, 2010.
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CHINA-MYANMAR RIVER NAVIGATION ROUTE
While China is constructing roads and railways transportation net 
linking itself to Southeast Asian countries, Yunnan also develops a water 
transport plan of constructing “two waterways reaching other provinces”, 
which are Jinsha River and You River leading to Yangtze River Delta and 
Pearl River Delta, and “three waterways reaching foreign countries”, 
which are Lancang-Mekong River, China-Myanmar Land and Water 
course, and China-Vietnam Hong River. 
Lancang-Mekong River, 4, 880 km long, runs through China, Laos, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. On January 7, 1997, China 
and Myanmar signed the “Agreement on Passenger and Cargo Shipment 
on the Lancang-Mekong River”. China opens the ports: Jinghong, Simao, 
Menghan and Guanlei, and Myanmar opens Wan Seng port and Wan Pong 
port. On April 20, 2000, China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand signed the 
“Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Lancang-Mekong River”. 
The official inauguration of the commercial navigation among the four 
countries followed on June 26, 2001.
At the end of 2006, China started oil shipping via the Mekong River. 
Two ships each carrying 150 tons of refined oil arrived at Guanlei port of 
Yunnan province from Thailand via the Mekong River, marking the trial 
launch of China’s oil shipping program with its Southeast Asian partners, 
and the waterway will serve as an alternative to the Strait of Malacca as a 
route for oil shipping and supply to Yunnan and Southwest China.
In order to improve the commercial navigability of the water course, 
China has initiated a program of dredging and removal of rapids, reefs 
and shoals in the Lower Mekong River. China provided a sum of RMB 42 
million Yuan for upgrading 331 km Mekong River course shared by Laos 
and Myanmar in 2000.
China-Myanmar land-water passage’s full name is “China Kunming-
Myanmar Yangon Irrawaddy River Portage Passage” which is an integra-
tive land and water carriage system including the land transport from 
Kunming to Bhamo via Baoshan and Ruili, the water course from Bhamo 
port to Yangon as well as other ports, portage transfers, sea ports. 
When He Zhiqiang, the Governor of Yunnan Province, visited Myan-
mar in 1989, Myanmar’s Prime Minister Saw Maung put forward that 
both sides made joint use of Irrawaddy River navigation. After this, China 
China’s “Look South”（FAN）2011】 53
and Myanmar held a series of talks, explorations and pre-feasibility stud-
ies on the proposal. In January, 1997, the Minister of Communications 
Ministry of China discussed the project with his Myanmar counterpart 
and both affirmed its significance. In October, Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo 
visited Myanmar and both sides agreed on the cooperative construction of 
China-Myanmar land and water transport passage. In 1998, China’s State 
Council gave official reply on the project to Yunnan government and 
agreed that Yunnan could start making preparations for it. 
The construction of Ruili-Bhamo road and Bhamo port with estimated 
investment of RMB 0.37 billion and RMB 0.16 billion Yuan, are at the core 
of Sino-Myanmar land and water passage. Both countries originally 
agreed on “joint construction and operation, joint share venture and prof-
it.” Nevertheless, Yangon later claimed that China would build the pas-
sage only in the form of “Build-Operate-Transfer” (BOT) in a thirty-year 
operating period. China still agreed to Yangon’s claim of BOT. 
Thus, the two countries subsequently finished the survey and design 
of Leiyun (in Ruili)-Bhamo class III road, reconnaissance and choosing site 
of Bhamo port, trial cargo navigation from Bhamo to Yangon. Also, the 
combined transport agreement framed by both experts was approved by 
two countries’ government in principle. China wanted to develop transit 
and bilateral transport in between, but Myanmar only permitted transit 
transport in its territory so that the plan of signing the agreement ran 
aground in 1999. 
Myanmar side agreed that China could use the Irrawaddy River as its 
outlet to the Indian Ocean when China’s President Jiang Zemin visited 
Myanmar in 2001. In the meantime, Burmese generals, however, attached 
three harsh terms so that the blue print went on being on the shelf again. 
Until now, Naypyitaw still has not given green light to the project. It was 
said that Than Shwe did not agree on it because “he does not want to see 
Chinese flags on the Irrawaddy River.”16) Obviously, Myanmar is very clear 
that the project, China’s access to the Indian Ocean, will change the geopo-
litical structure in Asia-Pacific region. It has to consider its peripheral 
counties’ and other stakeholders’ posture, notably India and ASEAN coun-
tries. Myanmar continues to take the wait-and-see attitude to make risk-
 16)  Min Zin, “China-Burma Relations: China’s Risk, Burma’s Dilemma”, in Lowell Dittmer, 
ed., Burma or Myanmar? The Struggle for National Identity, Singapre: World Scientific, 
2010, p.271.
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reward calculations.
Myanmar’s hesitation on the project has not retarded China’s effort 
for it. Zhangfeng is the nearest China’s port to Bhamo. Because the limit-
ed transport capacity of Zhangfeng-Bhamo road, Longchuan county gov-
ernment provided a sum of RMB 28 million Yuan to upgrade the road be-
tween Longchuan and Bhamo. The project was completed in 2006 and 
transferred to Myanmar side. Now China is still responsible for the main-
taince of the road.17) The 224 km Myitkyina-Kanpikete-Teng Chong cross-
border road began to be built with the prior section lying on the Myanmar 
side in 2004. With the assistance of Chinese engineers, the 96-km Myitkyi-
na-Kanpikete section in the Myanmar side had been completed and 
opened in April, 2007. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-MYANMAR TRANSPORT CORRIDOR
At least, the implications of Sino-Myanmar Transport Corridor can be 
understood from the followed dimensions: history, regional cooperation, 
China’s overall strategy and Yunnan’s perspective. 
History is a factor conditioning China’s perception of China-
Myanmar transport corridor as well as Myanmar strategic signifi-
cance as it has a bearing on Beijing’s strategic thinking and poli-
cies towards its Southern neighbor. 
Historical evidence has shown that China’s current vision of opening 
a route through Myanmar is nothing new. Historically, the famous South-
west Silk Road linked up China with Southeast Asia and South Asia via 
Yunnan. At the end of 19th century, British colonist ever attempted to build 
Yunnan-Burma railway but it failed partly because of Yunnan esquires’ ob-
jection. In 1906, “Yunnan Sichuan Railway Company” was founded, which 
raised fund and surveyed the route for Yunnan-Burma railway, but the pro-
ject had not started working until the end of Qing Dynasty. After Kuom-
intang seized power in China, the National Father, Sun Yat-Sen, claimed to 
construct a railway connecting Guangzhou with Burma’s railway net via 
Yunnan in his work “Programme of National Reconstruction for China”. 
Also, the scheme didn’t be put into effect in the end. Beijing suggested that 
 17)  Fan Lichuan & Li Qichang, “The Upgrade of Zhangfeng-Bhamo Road Starting”, Yunnan 
Daily, December 6, 2004.
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the two countries negotiate China-Burma “through transport” in 1955.18)
After China-Japan war broke out in the World War II, all China’s sea 
ports were occupied by Japanese troops. China built the Burma Road in 
1938 in order to gain international aid. Because Burma Road’s transport 
capacity was limited, China, U.K. and U.S. signed an agreement of build-
ing China-Burma railway that U.S. provided loan to the project, and China 
and U.K. cooperated to build it. At the end of 1938, the railway began to be 
constructed by 300,000 Yunnan laborers. When Japan overran Burma and 
the west of Yunnan in 1942, China had to destroy the finished section of 
railway lest Japanese troops would capitalize on it. 
Former Vice-Minster of Chinese Communications, Pan Qi, proposed in 
1985 that “the opening of the southwest [China] can run parallel to that of 
the east, and can be carried out at the same time.” Two channels from the 
southwest to the outside world were available: one to the East China coast 
along Yangtze and Xijiang Rivers; the other to South via Burma. “Several 
possible passage from Yunnan to the outside world. From Tengchong, one 
highway leads westward to Myitkyina, in Burma, where a railroad is 
available to transfer cargo to the sea. A second highway leads south to 
Lashio, another major Burmese railhead. And between those two, a third 
road leads Bhamo, on the Irrawaddy River. None of these roads is over 300 
kilometers long.”19)
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Yunnan side proposed to rebuild 
China-Burma rail, but the proposal was not adopted by Beijing. Whichever 
of the Yunnan-Burma ancient Tea Caravan Trail, the Burma Road, the 
Stilwell Road or the China-Burma rail it was, it showed the same econom-
ic, strategic and military significance of China-Burma transport route for 
China in different era. Since the end of 19th century and the beginning of 
20th century, Chinese made many efforts to build Sino-Burma railway but 
they failed finally because of China’s frail power and turbulent political 
 18)  “China Suggested that Both Negotiate China-Burma Through Traffic”, Archive of Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, No. 105－00177－01（1）.
 19)  Pan Qi, “Opening the Southwest: An Expert Opinion”, Beijing Review, 28:35 (September 2, 
1985), p.23. Western scholars often cites this article to illustrate Chinese vision of seeking 
an outlet via Burma is an old dream, such as: Bertil Lintner, “Friends of Necessity”, Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 164:51 (December 27, 2001- January 3, 2002), p.24.; J. Mohan 
Malik, “Sino-Indian Rivalry in Myanmar: Implications for Regional Security”, Contempo-
rary Southeast Asia, 16:2(September 1994), p.141; J. Mohan Malik, “Myanmar’s Role in Re-
gional Security: Pawn or Pivot?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 19:1(June 1997), p.57. Ac-
tually, China’s scheme was conceived at least in the beginning of 20th century.
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situation. Now, with the advent of rapid globalization, China’s rise and the 
launch of “West Development”, Beijing and Yunnan have blown the clarion 
of constructing China-Burma road and rail again, and wish to realize its 
old dream. 
On regional cooperation’s part, Sino-Myanmar transport cor-
ridor is Beijing’s both an important measure of maintaining its in-
fluence and leading role in the arrangement of regional and sub-
regional cooperation, and a result that China participates in the 
cooperation in Southeast Asia and South Asia. 
While China is promoting cross-border networks as a new regional 
common good, “it is driven by both the fear of loosing influence to other 
powers and the desire to create an open economic order in function of Chi-
nese interests. As goes for most forms of communication, it also appears in 
this case that the strongest player is best positioned for using these chan-
nels to its own advantage.” “Road diplomacy is thus an important device in 
China’s pursuit of competitive regionalization, and not an unsuccessful 
one.”20)
At present, Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina Peninsular, is one 
of the most energetic region of regional and subregional cooperation in 
Asia, where all kinds of regional cooperation mechanisms and platforms 
are overlapping. Myanmar is a juncture in the mutil-net. With regionalism 
rising in East Asia, China is being confronted with the challenge of how to 
maximize its interest in regional cooperation. 
In Southeast Asia and South Asia, both China and Myanmar have 
joined in China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, Great Mekong Subregion Coop-
eration (GMS), Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar regional cooperation 
(BCIM). Also, Myanmar is the member of BIMST-EC and Mekong-Ganga 
Cooperation. In these regional and subregional platforms, bilateral and 
multilateral cooperations on transportation are high priorities.
China-Myanmar railway is the west route of Trans-Asia Railway 
which is an important project cooperatively built by China and ASEAN. In 
December, 2002 and September, 2003, China and Myanmar acceded to 
“GMS Agreement for Facilitation of Cross-Border Transport of People and 
Goods”. The road between Kunming and Lashio via Ruili will be applicable 
 20)  Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Roads to Influence”, Brussels Institute of Contemporary China 
Studies Asia Paper, Vol. 5 (7), p.3, p.23.
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border channel and route for GMS facilitation transport, in terms of the 
agreement. 
In 1998, the 8th GMS Ministers meeting advanced to build economic 
corridor, combine construction of transport corridor with economic devel-
opment, and provide facilitation for GMS member’s cooperation and traf-
fic. GMS economic corridor consists of North-South Economic Corridor 
(cover Kunming-Bangkok, Kunming-Hanoi and Nanning-Hanoi three eco-
nomic zones), East-West Economic Corridor (cover from Mawlamyine to 
Thailand and middle Vietnam), and South Economic Corridor (cover the 
area from Bangkok to Phnom Penh and the south of Vietnam). In accord-
ance with the general layout of GMS transport net, economic corridor will 
develop in three stages: transport construction, logistics construction, and 
economic corridor construction.
China and ASEAN leaders signed “Joint Declaration of the Heads of 
State/Government of The People's Republic of China and The Member 
States of ASEAN On Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” at 
the seventh ASEAN-China Summit on October 8, 2003 in Bali, Indonesia. 
Pursuant to the Joint Declaration, a “Plan of Action to Implement the 
Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity” is formulated to serve as the “master plan” to deepen and 
broaden ASEAN-China relations and cooperation in a comprehensive and 
mutually beneficial manner for the next five years (2005-2010). In the 
light of the Plan of Action, ASEAN and China pursue the following joint 
actions and measures in the Mekong River Basin Development Coopera-
tion: “Develop the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link”; “Build railways and 
roads from Kunming to Yangon and Myitikyina”; “Carry out possibility 
study of building railway links from China to Laos  and Myanmar”; “ Con-
sider the further expansion of the Environmental Impact Assessment of 
the navigation channel improvement project on the upper Mekong River, 
and share information with the lower Basin countries”; “Consider the pos-
sibility to open more aviation routes in the sub-region at an appropriate 
time”.21)
Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam signed 
“Memorandum of Understanding Toward the Sustainable and Balanced 
 21)  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on 
ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”, December 21,2004, <http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/dqzzywt/t175815.htm>, accessed March 8, 2008. 
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Development of the GMS North-South Economic Corridor and Enhanced 
Organizational Effectiveness for Developing Economic Corridors” on 
March 31, 2008. It stated that “the economic North-South Economic Corri-
dor consists of three major routes linking economic and population centers 
in the northern and central parts of the GMS, namely:(I) the Kunming-
Chinag Rai-Bangkok via Lao PDR and Myanmar route, including both 
land transport and waterway; (II) the Kunming-Hanoi-Haiphong route; 
and (III) the Nanning-Haoi route.”22)
In crafting its foreign policy agenda towards Myanmar, “India also fo-
cuses on China’s relative gains. It is the China factor that motivates In-
dia’s Myanmar policy to take the neo-realist path [in 1993] and which 
compels India to court the junta.”23) Now, India is also exercising “connec-
tivity diplomacy” towards Southeast Asia. Delhi is building and planning 
to build India-Myanmar land networks, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilat-
eral Highway, and Delhi-Hanoi rail network via Myanmar to implement 
its “Look East” policy. The importance of India’s connectivity policy is fur-
ther augmented by the urge to connect itself with China’s regional initia-
tives on connectivity. As a result, India would do well to take its cue from 
China and enhance its own strategic advantage by enhancing connectivity 
in the region.24) Both Beijing and Delhi are undertaking their respective 
land transport connectivity initiatives with Southeast Asia. These projects 
will pave the way for regional economic cooperation and integration. “If In-
dia and China truly want to be leaders regionally and globally, they will 
 22)  “Memorandum of Understanding Toward the Sustainable and Balanced Development of 
the GMS North-South Economic Corridor and Enhanced Organizational Effectiveness for 
Developing Economic Corridors”, <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2008/3rd-GMS-
Summit/NSEC&Economic-Corridor.pdf>, accessed October 10, 2008.
 23)  Yogendra Singh, “India’s Myanmar Policy: A Dilemma between Realism and Idealism”, 
IPCS Special Report, No. 37, March 2007, p.3. For China’s factor in the change of Indian 
Myanmar policy in 1993, see Marie Lall, “India-Myanmar Relations – Geopolitics and En-
ergy in Light of the New Balance of Power in Asia”, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) 
Working Paper, the National University of Singapore, No.29, January 2, 2008; Bertil Lint-
ner, “The Indo-Burmese Frontier: A Legacy of Violence”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Janu-
ary 1, 1994; K. Yhome, “India-Myanmar Relations(1988-2008): A Decade of Redefining Bi-
lateral Ties”, Observer Research Foundation Occasional Paper, No. 10, January, 2009; Thin 
Thin Aung & Soe Myint, “India–Burma relations”, in Challenges to Democratization in 
Burma Perspectives on multilateral and bilateral responses, Stockholm: International In-
stitute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, p.100. 
 24)  Anushree Bhattacharya, “Linking South East Asia and India More Connectivity, Better 
Ties”, IPCS Special Report, No 50, February 2008, pp.2-5.
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first need to understand each other better and interact more closely at the 
people-to-people level. This cannot be achieved if the two countries contin-
ue to stand and stare at each other across the Himalayan barrier, with 
arms crossed instead of walking together arm in arm.”25) If the two coun-
tries enhance mutual trust and cooperation in the connectivity projects 
with Myanmar and other Southeast Asia countries, it will form a cross-
linked transport network, facilitating greater economic interaction in the 
region.
Under China’s overall strategy, Sino-Myanmar transport corri-
dor is the base of “Two-Ocean” strategy and a step of “Western
Development” strategy. 
In the Asia-Pacific area, China’s interests are focusing on economy 
and security dimensions which are reflected by its peripheral diplomatic 
principles-“good neighbor, good partner and good friend”. China’s good 
neighborhood policy is characterized by mutual security, mutual coopera-
tion and mutual development.
China shares land borders with 14 countries, whose border regions 
mostly are impoverished ethnic minority-inhabited areas. Such condition 
is adverse to the political stability of frontier, defense and the eradication 
of ethnic separatism. Therefore, Beijing launched the initiative of PBELP. 
The project is a reflection of China’s strategic and security consideration 
in its periphery. 
The problems in border regions to which Beijing addresses itself are 
very prominent and serious in Yunnan. There are 25 border counties in 
Yunnan, which include 22 ethnic minority autonomous counties and 17 
key poverty-alleviation counties. In addition, 16 trans-border ethnic 
groups live in frontier regions of Yunnan. It is learned that one hundred 
thousand border crossers in Yunnan have migrated to its neighbouring 
countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam in recent years 
thanks to poverty and comparative economic attraction abroad. “Some of 
them become the object whom ethnic separationist enlists, and have joined 
their armed forces in Yunnan frontier.”26)
In the matter of mutual security between China and Myanmar, Chi-
 25)  D Suba Chandran, N Manoharan, Vibhanshu Shekhar, Pg Raja Mohan, Jabin Jacob, “Con-
necting India: A Road Map for New Roads”, IPCS Issue Brief, No.58, January, 2008.
 26)  Chen Yanhui, “Blurred boundaries: Yunnan One Hundred Thousand Border Crossers Mi-
grate Abroad”, Phoenix Weekly, No. 19, 2007. 
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na’s interest in Myanmar, first of all, lies in ensuring 2,186 km-long 
boundary’s and frontier’s security. In this regard, China need solve the dif-
ficult problems of border control, trans-border ethnic issues, AIDS control, 
and drug smuggling. The Color Revolution in Central Asia since the ad-
vent of 21st century, the turbulence in Myanmar, and Washington’s atti-
tude to Naypyitaw are also making Beijing keep a close watch on Myan-
mar situation. Consequently, China necessarily keeps enough influence 
and control ability on Sino-Myanmar frontiers if it wants to solve the 
abovementioned threats to its national security. Now, Beijing’s intentions 
and efforts on China-Myanmar border safety, the maintenance of influence 
over Myanmar are being materialized through the construction of the 
roads and railways reaching Sino-Myanmar ports and boundary.
Also, China-Myanmar transport corridor is responsible for carrying 
out the “Two-Ocean” strategy. When Japan occupied China’s east seaports 
and cut off Pacific water course in 1940s, the Burma Road played an im-
portant role in defending China’s national security. The experience has 
been strongly impressed on Chinese memory until now. Currently, attrib-
uting to Chinese weak navy forces, the “Malacca Dilemma”, South China 
Sea dispute, Taiwan issue, and other threats to the Pacific Ocean course 
further increase Beijing’s anxiety about its overreliance on the Pacific 
Ocean course, and attention to Myanmar’s role as a strategic passage. 
Therefore, China constructs a new strategic thoroughfare ensuring nation-
al security through China-Myanmar transport corridor access to the Indi-
an Ocean in order to reduce the reliance on the Pacific Ocean course and 
the Malacca Strait. To expand China’s influence in Southeast Asia and 
South Asia and counterbalance India’s presence in the two regions are 
also the aim of the transport corridor. 
As for mutual cooperation and mutual development, China-Myanmar 
transport corridor is the extension of “West Development” strategy. For a 
long time, transport infrastructure has been weak and economy develops 
slowly in the West China. In the “West Development” strategy, China 
wants to use Myanmar as a relay station for the export of West China’s 
product and import of resources, and a convenient channel for Southwest 
China’s opening-up. For Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan and other West provinc-
es in China, China-Myanmar transport corridor not only facilitates them 
nearer to foreign markets than the Pacific Ocean route but gives them the 
opportunity to breach the bottleneck of inadequate transport infrastructure.
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With reference to Yunnan local perspective, Yunnan is the direct 
promoter, and beneficiary of China-Myanmar transport corridor. 
Yunnan is a landlocked plateau province in China, and its size of 
mountainous and semi-mountainous region amounts to 94 percent. Yun-
nan’s backward transport infrastructure impedes its economic develop-
ment and opening-up. In this regard, Yunnan government believes that 
“because Yunnan’s special geographic location, the transport construction 
in Yunnan is not only important for its economic development but for the 
construction of China’s transport net as well as Asia and world transport 
net. The construction of ‘Yunnan International Passage’ will provide it 
with golden opportunity of opening-up and development, and make it com-
pletely get rid of the image of remoteness, closeness and backwardness.”27)
As the China’s bridgehead facing Southeast Asia, Yunnan has distinct 
advantage of linking up with the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the 
three markets of China, Southeast Asia and South Asia. For Yunnan far 
from China’s economic and market centre, the “International Passage” 
bears more immediate, more practical and more important meaning. 
Hence, Yunnan is the protagonist and activist of the program, and actively 
strives for Beijing’s support. In recent years, Yunnan has submitted the 
proposal about the “International Passage” to Beijing for many times, and 
expects that the project can be incorporated in the central government’s 
macro plan so that it can gain Beijing’s support of fund and policy. For ex-
ample, Yunnan delegation proposed that the “International Passage” be in-
cluded in the list of “National General and Special Transportation Pro-
gram” at the Fourth session of the Tenth National People’s Congress in 
2006, and brought forward “Proposal of Central Government supporting 
Yunnan to Construct ‘International Passage’ linking South Asia and 
Southeast Asia” at the First Session of the Eleventh National Committee 
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March, 2008. 
Above all, the construction of China-Myanmar transport corridor 
brings Yunnan the most immediate and greatest advantage of offering an 
opportunity to improve its transportation, which has been lagging. In the 
meantime, it attempts to improve its economic and political status in Chi-
na by means of its role as the channel and pivot to the Indian Ocean. For 
 27)  Qin Guangrong, “Qin Guangrong’s Remarks on the Construction of Yunnan International 
Passage”, July 27, 2006, <http://www.yn.gov.cn/yunnan,china/72622743014604800/
20060727/1088276.html>, accessed January 1, 2008.
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example, Yunnan wishes that China-Myanmar rail link becomes “a break-
through of making use of our province’s regional superiority. To construct 
the passage between Yunnan and Myanmar reaching the Indian Ocean 
and connecting Asia and Europe with Africa, to establish Yunnan prov-
ince’s new geo-strategic status, namely International Strategic Passage. 
Yunnan’s strategic status will be raised in China’s overall political and 
economic structure.”28)
On the other hand, through the construction of the corridor, Yunnan 
can fulfill the linkage of transport net between it, Southeast Asia and 
South Asia, and lay a foundation for its economic development and open-
ing-up. In the economic integration of Yunnan, Southeast Asia and South 
Asia, Yunnan wants to adjust and upgrade its economic structure, develop 
superior resources and improve entironment.
CONCLUSION
It has been an old dream that China desires to link its southwestern 
provinces to the Indian Ocean via Burma/Myanmar since the beginning of 
20th century. The dream has gone through three distinct eras: late Qing 
dynasty; Republic of China era; the People’s Republic of China era. Now, 
Beijing is fulfilling its dream in the post-Cold War era because of combina-
tion of objective and subjective conditions. 
With the end of Cold War and rapid economic globalization, East 
Asian market which was partitioned because of serious ideological, politi-
cal, economic, and military confrontation during the Cold War has further 
been integrated. Regionalism rising, regional economic integration and co-
operation are progressively boosting in Asia. Meanwhile, China’s economic 
needs and development is unprecedentedly linked to overseas markets. 
The economic cooperations between China and Southeast Asian countries, 
such as China-ASEAN FTA and GMS, afford China favourable opportuni-
ties to develop its plan. Accordingly, the corridor is a result of a radically 
changed international and regional environment. 
China-Myanmar transport corridor is just one part of Beijing’s region-
al cross-border initiatives on transport. They are mainly motivated by Chi-
 28)  Li Ping, Li Yigan, ed., Study on Singapore-Kunming Route of Trans-Asia Railway, Kun-
ming: Yunnan Minority Press, 2000, p.22.
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na’s economic and political-cum strategic considerations. Since Beijing 
adopted the open policy in 1978, China has gradually changed from a con-
tinental to a maritime power, and has shifted from a land-based, inward-
looking to a sea-focused, outward-looking country which is increasingly de-
pendent upon external trade through oceanic routes, and is driving its 
thirst for raw materials, markets for its goods, and investment for its econ-
omy. “China presents its involvement in the development of regional 
transportation networks as a product of a rather liberalist concern to cre-
ate an open Asian market; its drivers tend to be mercantilist and driven 
by worries about the relative economic and military influence of other 
powers in the region.” China does recognize the importance of dense and 
open trans-Asian logistic networks, but what matters is who succeeds to 
use them most effectively in the competition for investment, export mar-
kets and natural resources. It has become clear that new logistic arteries 
have facilitated China to strengthen its economic position in its neigh-
bourhood. Markets that used to be inaccessible are now directly connected 
to China’s rapidly growing economy.29)
Consequently, China seeks an overland route through Myanmar to a 
port from which it can export goods to mainland Southeast Asia, India and 
other developing countries farther afield.30) The corridor is a manifestation 
of China’s transformation from a continental to a maritime power. The 
above-noted China’s economic intention on the corridor is materialized 
and pushed by its several critical schemes and decisions.
Beijing has begun to promote border trade since mid-1980s. In early 
1990s China promulgated the strategy of opening its border areas. In this 
regard, the State Council approved Wan Ding and Ruili neighboring My-
anmar as the opened city, where two border economic cooperation zones 
were established later. In 1993, De Hong prefecture was opened as border 
trade area. Up to now, Yunnan has 11 first-category ports, 9 second-catego-
ry ports, 193 border crossings and sites for barter trade between border 
residents, of which 90 percent lead to Myanmar. At the same time, Myan-
mar also legitimized border trade and opened China-Myanmar border 
trade in 1988. In 1991 and 1992, Yangon opened Muse, Namkham, Kyu-
kok, Ho Pang, Chinshwehaw, Myitkyina and Bhamo for two countries’ bor-
 29)  Jonathan Holslag, “China’s roads to influence”, Brussels Institute of Contemporary China 
Studies Asia Paper, Vol. 5 (7), pp.22-23.
 30)  “Myanmar and China: New Horizons”, The Economist, 326 (January 23, 1993), p.32. 
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der trade.
Both interactions on border trade have made Myanmar become the 
largest trade partner of Yunnan since 1995. In China-Myanmar trade, 
Yunnan’s share holds 49.6 percent, and the border trade average percent-
age is 75.6 percent in Yunnan-Myanmar trade. For landlocked inland Yun-
nan, its poor transport has directly been hindering the volume of trade be-
tween it and Myanmar. So, in recent 20 years, Yunnan government has 
never discontinued the construction or upgrade of roads and ports stretch-
ing to Sino-Myanmar border in China and Myanmar territory.
In response to Beijing’s “Western Development”, Yunnan launched 
“Yunnan International Passage” initiative in 1999, and it undoubtedly 
greatly promotes the corridor. Of course, China’s rapid economic growth 
makes it possibly have enough financial power to invest in transport con-
struction over past 20 years and in future. For example, in terms of the 
project of PBELP in Yunnan, Central and Yunnan government pooled 
RMB 1.90410 billion Yuan to upgrade and build highway in Yunnan bor-
der regions from 2008 to 2010.
Besides the economic objective, both political and geo-strategic calcu-
lations lie behind Sino-Myanmar transport corridor. The PBELP project is 
a reflection of China’s political consideration on the corridor. According to 
the project, the construction and upgrade of civil road in border areas aims 
at maintaining stability and increasing power of influence there. Addition-
ally, such an outlet would also reduce transport time for some of China’s 
trade and would avoid the Malacca Strait choke point in the event of a 
conflict in the South China Sea.
Nowhere is the game of encirclement and counter-encirclement be-
tween China and India more evident than in Myanmar. Although Beijing 
has never admitted “Two-Ocean” strategy, its efforts in pursuit of an ex-
port and import outlet to mainland Southeast Asia, and access to the Indi-
an Ocean via Myanmar, are so obvious. It undoubtedly incurs Indian sus-
picions and worries.
There is the purported Chinese physical presence in Burma̶in par-
ticular reports of Chinese military bases in Myanmar.31) The imperatives of 
China’s expanding economy (including its energy needs) have added an-
 31)  See, for example, Andrew Selth, “Burma, China and the Myth of Military Bases”, Asian Se-
curity, 3:3 (2007), pp.279-307.
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other dimension to the debate. “Whatever the case, the fact remains that 
in recent years Myanmar is seen as having moved too close to China for 
India’s or ASEAN’s comfort. It does not matter whether China’s expansion 
is dictated by economic or by strategic interests. What matters is that Bei-
jing’s Myanmar policy is a manifestation of a Chinese desire to be a major 
power in both the Pacific and Indian oceans.”32)
The corridor will not only further integrate two countries’ economy 
but combine both political and strategic interests. Thus, it contains India’s 
influence in Myanmar, and finally expands its strategic influence into 
Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Also, Naypyidaw’s isolation and 
China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline have provided China favourable op-
portunities to realize its old dream of China-Burma/Myanmar transport 
link. Nevertheless, China’s old dream still faces challenges and difficulties. 
In the long run, the achievement of two countries’ final transport link and 
the emergence of Myanmar’s traffic pivot, will require at least these fac-
tors: further trust between China and Myanmar; Myanmar economic de-
velopment and prosperity which requires massive traffic infrastructure; 
the stability and some form of democratization or pluralism in Myanmar, 
particularly the solution of ethnic minorities problems; deeper regional in-
tegration and cooperation between China, Southeast Asia and South Asia; 
stable economic development in the three subregions; and the degree of 
Myanmar integration into the global economy and of the acceptance of in-
ternational community to it.
 32)  J. Mohan Malik, “Sino-Indian Rivalry in Myanmar: Implications for Regional Security”, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 16:2, (September 1994), p.61.

